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The East Asian crisis of 1997 sparked an extensive literature in an effort to explain the 
causes and spread of heightened foreign exchange (FX) market pressures in the region. In 
this paper we model FX movements and calculate spillover effects covering the extended 
period between 1990 and 2004. Using Markov switching vector autoregressions, we find 
substantial evidence that FX correlations vary across crisis and non-crisis states, a result 
that bears implications for international portfolio diversification and reserve pooling. 
Contagion effects are also present during crises. Finally, we gauge the ability of stock 
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  A 1999 IMF factsheet on the Fund’s response to the Asian crisis of 1997 states 
that “[...] the IMF, along with everyone else, did not foresee the scale of the financial 
contagion that followed the events in Thailand”.
2 A key event was the devaluation of the 
Thai baht in July 1997. Even though Thailand was running a current account deficit of 
almost 8% of GDP and, hence, was susceptible to an exchange rate correction, other 
countries in the region, that were subsequently affected by speculative attacks in the 
foreign exchange market, were not experiencing equivalently large external imbalances at 
the time. The region’s rapid real GDP growth rates in the early 1990s had earned the 
countries the title ‘Asian Tigers’. With a reputation for fiscal prudence and reasonably 
low inflation rates it seemed that little threatened continued economic advance. 
  With the liberalization of capital accounts new foreign money was channelled into 
economies usually through the banking system. However, a combination of asymmetric 
information and moral hazard problems led to excessive borrowing (e.g. Mishkin, 1999, 
Corsetti et al., 1998). An underestimation of the risks both by bank managers and 
international investors meant that several firms were burdened with substantial amounts 
of foreign currency short-term debt. This constituted a serious problem, as most firms’ 
earnings were in local currency, an imbalance that seriously exposed them to the risk of 
devaluation.    
  So, uniquely in the recent history of crises, the source of the Asian crisis was not 
some serious macroeconomic imbalance but rather the inability of the private sector to 
allocate funds to the most productive uses through the appropriate assessment of risks. In 
other words, the region’s problem was structural in the sense that financial market 
                                                 
2 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm. 
  2regulation, supervision and management were inadequate. Related speculative pressures 
in the FX markets eventually led the south-east Asian governments to abolish the pegs (at 
least temporarily) and, as a result, the region’s currencies depreciated sharply. The real 
effects in the region were painful, as economic growth was adversely affected.  
  Since the Asian crisis, a substantial amount of research has examined the 
mechanisms through which it was dispersed amongst countries in the region. This paper 
covers similar ground, but uses recently devised econometric tools. It also exploits a more 
complete set of data running up until 2004. This allows comparisons to be made between 
crises and non-crisis periods. More specifically, the paper addresses a number of research 
questions. 
            First, is the relationship between currencies as measured by exchange rates 
different from that between wider FX market pressure indicators? If so, this suggests that 
different countries may respond to spillover effects in different ways with some allowing 
the exchange rate to take the strain of adjustment and others opting for rising interest 
rates and/or reserve decumulation. Second, does the relationship (the extent and nature of 
the spillovers) differ between crisis and non-crisis periods? This is an important question 
for the risk reduction of internationally diversified portfolios. If the relationship changes, 
then what might be sensible behaviour before a crisis may not be as sensible during (or 
after) it. Third, are contagion effects present is south-east Asian FX markets and, if yes, 
which countries are the sources and which the recipients? And finally, do stock markets 
anticipate crises in foreign exchange markets? Given that the Asian crisis was largely 
generated in the private sector where potential risks had accumulated, we test to see 
  3whether stock prices contain information about anticipated switches from tranquil to 
crisis states.  
             The paper is empirical. We do not seek to impose and test any particular model. 
However, the relationships we examine are informed by the relevant theory. A 
concluding section briefly discusses some of the policy implications of our findings.  
  
Data and Variables 
  Monthly nominal bilateral exchange rates with the US dollar for Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are taken from International Financial Statistics 
published by the IMF. Figures 1, 2 and 3 capture the recent history of exchange rate 
movements in the East Asian FX markets, including the turbulence in 1997. The five 
countries in our sample (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) had 
implemented a variety of exchange rate regimes over the sample period, but immediately 
before July 1997 they were all de facto fixing their currencies to the US dollar. When 
speculative pressures in the region arose, interest rates escalated and international 
reserves fell in an effort to defend the values of the local currencies. Eventually, the 
countries abolished their quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes and floated their currencies.
3  
  We use the above-mentioned variables (nominal exchange rates, interest rates and 
international reserves) in the construction of a foreign exchange (FX) market pressure 
indicator (fxmpi). Our analysis is based on two ‘crisis’ measures: the percentage change 
                                                 
3 According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) prior to the 1997 events all countries in the sample were 
running de facto pegs against the US dollar (except Malaysia, which was operating a de facto moving band 
around the US dollar). Post-crisis all currencies were freely floating (or falling). Eventually some reverted 
to managed floats (Philippines, Thailand) or established new pegs (Malaysia). 
  4in the values of the nominal exchange rate (dlxr) and fxmpi.
4 Increases in the value of 
fxmpi signify more pressure (hence the negative sign for the reserves component of the 
indicator). 
[] 100 * * * * t t t t dlres dir dlxr fxmpi γ β α − + = , 
where dir is the change in the domestic interest rate and dlres is the change in the natural 
logarithm of international reserves minus gold (in dollars). The weights of the variables 
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where SD stands for standard deviation. The need to both measures arises from the fact 
that it is possible that nominal exchange rate movements do not reveal the extent of 
speculative pressures. These may be reflected by the use of other policy instruments (e.g. 
reserves, interest rates and capital controls). Hence, we can use fxmpi to assess the 
presence of speculative pressures and dlxr to determine how successful these have been. 
                                                 
4 fxmpi has its roots in Girton and Roper (1977). The use of similar indices to capture pressures in the FX 
market is not unusual (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1996), even though there have also been criticisms (see Eika 
et al., 1996 and Willett and Nitithanprapas, 2000). 
  5We do not incorporate a measure of capital controls in our estimations because of the 
unreliability of data.  
  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the two crisis measures. 
Even though percent changes in exchange rates are highly correlated between countries in 
the sample, the same cannot be said about the wider pressure indicator.  Figures 2a and 
2b plot all series over time. The increased volatility in mid 1997 is evident everywhere.  
 
Tranquil and Crisis Regimes 
  To model the time series we adopt a commonly used strategy for the analysis of 
structural change: a Markov regime switching model (Hamilton, 1989). This approach is 
appropriate, as the model assumes autoregressive processes in which the parameters 
depend on the realizations of an unobserved regime variable, which in turn is modelled as 
a Markov chain. The latter assumes that realizations of the state only depend on their 
(chronologically) previous realization. The regime variable is discrete and can only take 
two values: 0 if there is no crisis and the distribution has a low mean and 1 if there is a 
‘crisis’ and the distribution has a high mean. In contrast to Hamilton (1989) we assume a 
heteroscedastic setting in which the variance changes across the two regimes. 
  The model can be written as 
() ( ) [] ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t s y s y s y ε µ β µ β µ ρ ρ ρ + − + + − = − − − − − ... 1 1 1 , 
where ρ  denotes the order of the autoregression and µ  is the regime-dependent mean 
conditional on the state variable,  . In this setting, we can estimate the matrix of 
transition probabilities (which contains the probabilities of remaining in one regime or of 
switching to another). In the case with two regimes we have four such probabilities:  , 
t s
11 p
  612 p ,   and  , where, for example,   gives the probability of remaining in regime 1 
and   gives the probability of switching from regime 1 to regime 2.
5  
21 p 22 p 11 p
12 p
Table 2a gives the results of the estimations of heteroscedastic Markov switching 
(intercept) models with two regimes and three autoregressive terms for fxmpi.
6 It can be 
seen that for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines regime 1 is identified as the 
one with higher FX pressures (as captured by the higher mean). In contrast, for Thailand 
regime 1 is the low pressure regime. In all cases, regime 2 is more volatile (as captured 
by the higher standard error of the regression). Both regimes are quite persistent, although 
regime 2 less so than 1. Results for dlxr (Table 2b) are quite similar, although regimes are 
now less persistent. In addition, and consistent with the rest of the sample, regime 2 for 
Thailand is now a crisis regime. Malaysia’s distributions of observations across the two 
regimes are the same. This could reflect Malaysia’s use of capital controls. 
Visual inspection of the crisis regime probabilities using both measures (not 
reported) shows that for most countries the period from mid 1997 to early 1998 was 
characterized by speculative pressures and falls into the category of a crisis regime. Of 
course, the apparent ‘synchronicity’ of the incidence of crises may  reflect regional inter-
dependence arising from trade links, a common unobserved shock, or contagion ( defined 
as a change in the ‘real’ transmission mechanism following a country-specific shock). 
  In this paper, we do not try to determine the exact classification of the spillovers 
although we do test several related hypotheses. First, we examine the contemporaneous 
correlations between the pressure indicators across regimes. This has important 
                                                 
5 The model of Hamilton assumes that the transition probabilities are constant. This has the implication that 
exogenous variables cannot affect the probability of switching from one regime to another. Diebold (1994), 
Filardo (1994) and Filardo and Gordon (1998) extend the model to time-varying transition probabilities. 
We use a variation of Filardo and Gordon (1998) later in the paper. 
6 Setting a different lag length than the reported of three months does not affect the results substantially. 
  7implications for portfolio management. The possibility that the correlations may change 
sign and/or magnitude in different states of the world could affect the risk characteristics 
of a portfolio comprising holdings in the different markets. In order to carry out this 
exercise we need to extend the methodology to a Markov switching vector autoregression 
(see Kolzig, 1997). Examining the FX market in the context of a system of interrelated 
economies has the advantage that we are allowing the market in question to be affected 
by recent movements in other markets as well as by recent movements in the market 
itself. Hence we can calculate and compare the (regime-dependent) correlations.  
  Second, we construct the multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
contagion test, as proposed by Dungey et al. (2005). This allows us to examine the effects 
of each country’s FX market on the rest of the countries in the sample, while controlling 
for the effect of heteroscedasticity.
7 
  Finally, we extend the Markov switching setting to one that allows the transition 
probabilities to vary over time. This permits us to investigate the predictive information 
contained in an exogenous variable. We select a one-month lag of each country’s stock 
market index as the exogenous variable to examine whether movements in stock markets 
lead movements in FX markets.      
 
Regime-dependent Correlations 
  Turning to the VAR version of the fixed transition probability model, the system 
can now be written as 
                                                 
7 One needs to be careful with the use of the term contagion, as it been associated with numerous 
definitions in the literature, which can be interpreted loosely or strictly. Our approach does not include 
fundamentals given the monthly frequency of our data and the absence of agreement in the literature on 
what would constitute a universally accepted set of fundamentals. Hence, we resort to a looser definition of 
contagion, namely ‘a significant change in the transmission mechanism of shocks during a crisis’. 
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where y is a vector of dependent variables and B denotes a matrix of estimated parameters 
with rows equal to j and columns equal to the number of variables in y. Estimation of this 
model assuming two regimes and an autoregressive order ρ =1 (consistent with the 
Schwarz criterion) gives the results reported in table 3. It is evident that, for both 
measures, regime 1 is classified as a tranquil regime with a low mean and variance, 
whereas regime 2 is classified as a crisis regime with a high mean (indicating 
devaluations/pressures in FX) and increased volatility. The tranquil regime continues to 
be highly persistent implying that switching to a crisis regime is associated with a 
relatively low probability. Switching back from a crisis regime to a tranquil one is, on the 
other hand, associated with a higher probability, even though crisis regimes are also fairly 
persistent.  
  Figure 3 plots the (smoothed) probabilities of being in crisis across the two 
measures. Following the turbulence of the second half of 1997 the FX pressures overall 
subsided. However, the second graph shows that exchange rate depreciation continued for 
several years after 1997 without being accompanied by higher interest rates or a loss of 
reserves. 
  Table 4 shows the estimated correlations for the five countries across the two 
regimes. It can be seen that, for both measures, correlations change from one regime to 
the other. It is interesting to note that with the fxmpi it is not only the magnitude that 
changes but also, in several instances, the sign as well. For example, Thailand’s 
correlations with the rest of the countries in the sample change sign across the two 
regimes. Using dlxr it is mainly the magnitude that changes.  
  9  However, an investor with no sophisticated information about the prevailing state 
of the world at each observation would potentially base his/her fund allocation strategy 
on non-regime dependent (constant) correlations like those reported in Tables 1c and 1d. 
Even though the differences between the constant correlations and the crisis ones are less 
pronounced, it is still possible for the constant correlations to convey misleading 
information. For example, Thailand’s fxmpi correlation with Korea is -2.6% increasing to 
3.5% during crises. The implication is that an investor with assets in Thailand and Korea, 
who may have allocated funds based on the small negative correlation between the two 
countries, will find that the benefits from such diversification are reduced during times of 
crisis, as the devaluation probability and associated default risks increase simultaneously 
in both countries in times of FX turbulence. Even so, in most cases the signs of the 
contemporaneous correlations are retained and differences in magnitude are not dramatic, 
a fact that limits the usefulness of the extra information contained in regime-dependent 
correlations. The same conclusion can be reached from an analysis of exchange rate 
correlations.     
 
Contagion 
          We now turn to the issue of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have shown that 
an increase in correlations in a crisis state does not necessarily represent contagion. Even 
without a change in the real transmission mechanism (our definition of contagion) the 
increased volatility in one market will result in higher correlation with another market in 
a crisis state. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) construct a correlation coefficient that controls 
  10for the effects of heteroscedasticity. Dungey et al. (2005) have extended the test in a 
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where  t , 1 ω  contains the stacked values of fxmpi or dlxr for country 1 (the observations 
that correspond to the tranquil periods stacked on top of the observations that correspond 
to the crisis periods),  nc σ  denotes the (non time-varying) standard deviation of the non-
crisis observations, φ  and  χ  are vectors of estimated coefficients, Λis a matrix 























, and   t δ  is a stacked dummy variable taking the value 0 if the system 
is in a tranquil state and 1 if it is in a crisis state.  
  The system of equations is estimated with the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) method. The estimates contained in χ  capture contagion effects (if any) so that 
we can examine the direction and magnitude of spillovers arising from a particular 
country during a crisis. Table 5 presents results for fxmpi and dlxr. Focusing on the FX 
market pressure indicator it turns out that Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines seem to 
‘export’ their FX pressures to Indonesia and Thailand, both of which appear to be victims 
of contagion during the sample period. Thailand on the other hand, which was the first 
country to devalue in 1997, only seems to affect Korea. These results suggest that 
contagion may be present but may be more constrained than is sometimes assumed. 
Focusing on exchange rate changes, there is no clear direction of contagion effects. 
  11Indonesia affects and is affected by Thailand. It also affects the Philippines, which in turn 
affects Thailand and Korea. Korea affects Malaysia.  
  Clearly, the results between fxmpi and dlxr are strikingly different, which 
highlights the different types of information that the two measures convey: fxmpi is a 
wider measure and can indicate a crisis even in the absence of an actual devaluation, 
whereas dlxr only indicates a crisis when there is a substantial loss in the value of the 
currency (in terms of $US) but can miss speculative pressures where the use of reserves 
and the interest rate has been successful.   
 
The Informational Content of Stock Prices 
  Up to this point, we have assumed constant (time-invariant) transition 
probabilities, as in Hamilton (1989) and Krolzig (1997). However, this structure does not 
allow us to consider the role of additional variables in forecasting transition probabilities. 
Hence, we extend the framework to include time-varying transition probabilities, as in 
Filardo and Gordon (1998).
8 Gibbs sampling techniques are used to estimate parameters 
of the unobserved state variable.
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The above expression simply tells us that the probability that the unobserved state 
variable assumes a specific value (that can only be 0 or 1) depends on the previous value 
of the state variable and an exogenous time series,  .  t z
                                                 
8 Cerra and Saxena (2002) use a time-varying setting to test contagion effects for Indonesia during the 1997 
crisis. 
9 For a discussion of Gibbs sampling see Casella and George (1992). For details of implementation of the 
estimations please contact the corresponding author. The Gauss code is available on Martin Ellison’s 
webpage at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/ellison/.  
  12  In this empirical exercise we examine the ability of (lagged) stock market 
movements to explain changes in regime, in particular the movement from a tranquil to a 
crisis period. The choice of a stock market index as a ‘leading indicator’ is based on the 
informational value that stock prices contain about the future. Stocks are valued on the 
basis of discounted future cash flows. Under normal circumstances, an expected ordinary 
devaluation (i.e. not one that is associated with a slowdown or recession) could have 
beneficial effects for an export-orientated firm without foreign currency obligations. 
However, in the case of south-east Asia, following the liberalization of the capital 
account, several firms were burdened with foreign currency debt when the primary 
sources of revenues were in local currency (see Mishkin, 1999). Hence, any evidence of a 
looming devaluation would potentially lead to the selling of stocks, especially by 
international investors. We use the one-month lag of the stock market index to reduce the 
potential problem of two-way causation. 
Table 6 reports the estimated parameters for the FX market pressure equation 
() [] () t t t s y L η α α φ + − − − 1 0 1 , where   is either of our two pressure measures and  t y ( ) L φ  
is a polynomial in the lag operator of order 3. It also reports the parameters of the 
transition probability equation  , where   is a latent variable 
and  is the lagged stock market index (in natural logarithms). To obtain estimation 
results for these equations one needs to have informed priors for parameters 
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z γ  and  s γ .
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10Note that the estimations are carried out for three of the countries in the dataset, as we have been unable 
to obtain a full series for the stock market indices of Indonesia and Thailand. 
  13The results provide some support for the hypothesis that the information 
contained in movements of the stock market can be used to forecast the transition 
probabilities of a FX pressure model. The estimated coefficient  z γ  is on most occasions 
negative, which confirms that increases in the stock index are associated with a higher 
probability of remaining in a non-crisis state. Equivalently, decreases in the value of the 
stock market index are associated with a higher probability of switching to a crisis state. 
Parameters  0 γ  and  s γ  capture the asymmetry in the durations between tranquil and crisis 
periods. More specifically, non-crisis periods last longer than crisis periods. Parameters 
1 φ ,  2 φ  and  3 φ  describe the dynamics of the autoregression and parameters  0 α  and  1 α  
correspond to the FX market pressure equation reported above. It can be seen that the 
mean rates of change for the tranquil and crisis states are negative and positive, 
respectively (recall that a positive rate of change indicates higher FX pressure). The 
estimated variance is also reported for each country.  
  Despite the encouraging results achieved, the model tends to identify fewer crises 
than their actual frequency. Of course, there is no official definition of what constitutes a 
crisis, so we resort to constructing an ad hoc measure to facilitate comparisons. We 
assign a value of 1, and hence indicate a crisis, if an observation is greater than the 
average of the series (fxmpi or dlxr) plus 1.5 times the standard deviation of the series. 
Figure 4 compares the ‘actual’ chronology of crises with the model’s assigned 
‘smoothed’ probabilities of crises. The model with fxmpi does relatively well in 
identifying some but not all crisis incidents. The model with dlxr picks up most of the 
crises. 
  
  14Concluding Remarks  
  In this paper, we have used recent advances in econometric techniques to answer 
questions about the interrelationships between south-east Asian foreign exchange markets 
during the period 1990-2004. South east Asia is particularly interesting given the 
opportunity to examine a number of countries that are frequently and somewhat loosely 
classified together, as well as the transition sequence from periods that may be 
characterised as non-crisis to crisis and back to non- crisis. 
         We discover different results depending on whether we use correlations between 
nominal exchange rates or between a broader indicator of foreign exchange market 
pressure that incorporates changes in interest rates and reserves. We also find that the 
relationships differ as between crisis and non-crisis periods. We further examine whether 
the increased correlations for some countries during crises represent contagion. Finally, 
we investigate whether movements in stock market prices anticipate crises in terms of 
changes in transition probabilities.  
  Although the paper is empirical, it is informed by relevant theory and our results 
are not counter-theoretical. Moreover, they have potentially important policy 
implications. The observed change in correlations we discover as between non-crisis and 
crisis periods suggests that some types of diversification that may be risk-reducing during 
a non-crisis period may not be risk-reducing during a crisis. It also suggests that reserve 
pooling arrangements that depend on negative correlations amongst participants may be 
ill-informed if non-crisis periods are used to identify correlations that are, in reality, 
contingent on whether crises exist. However, the differences between simple regime-
independent correlations (which are most likely to be observed by agents) and crisis state 
  15correlations are smaller than differences between crisis and non-crisis regime 
correlations. Still, controlling for shifts in the states of the world provides useful 
information to economic agents.  Moreover, our findings suggest that policy initiatives to 
mitigate contagion may need to have a more limited focus than is sometimes assumed. 
We find some evidence of contagion, which does not appear to be as widespread as it is 
often assumed. Finally, we find that stock market indices have some explaining power of 
FX regime switches.
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  18Table 1a: Descriptive statistics fxmpi. 
 
  fxmpi_IND  fxmpi_KOR  fxmpi_MAL  fxmpi_PHI  fxmpi_THA 
 Mean   0.926   0.872   0.79   1.271   0.601 
 Median   0.841   0.727   0.595   0.305   0.697 
 Maximum   38.069   8.141   27.597   41.194   13.328 
 Minimum  -12.581 -6.346 -18.019 -16.39  -8.076 
 Std. Dev.   5.081   2.258   3.96   6.798   2.357 
 Skewness   2.281   0.218   1.272   1.946   0.351 
 Kurtosis   19.518   4.291   16.483   13.242   9.428 
 Jarque-Bera   2190   13   1404   895   311 
 Observations   179   179   179   179   179 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive statistics dlxr 
 
  dlxr_IND  dlxr_KOR  dlxr_MAL  dlxr_PHI  dlxr_THA 
 Mean   0.913   0.240   0.19   0.512   0.234 
 Median   0.358   0.088   0.0   0.144  -0.025 
 Maximum   67.722   36.95   15.679   13.775   17.237 
 Minimum  -26.884 -8.856  -14.1  -7.126 -15.377 
 Std. Dev.   7.861   3.579   2.4   2.331   3.063 
 Skewness   3.824   6.241   1.15   1.497   1.609 
 Kurtosis   34.622   64.704   23.33   10.774   18.345 
 Jarque-Bera   7894   29559   3122   517   1833 
 Observations   179   179   179   179   179 
 
Table 1c: Correlations fxmpi 
 
  fxmpi_IND  fxmpi_KOR  fxmpi_MAL  fxmpi_PHI  fxmpi_THA 
MPI_IND    1       
MPI_KOR   0.117   1       
MPI_MAL  -0.012   0.057   1     
MPI_PHI  -0.042  -0.023   0.135   1   
MPI_THA   0.193  -0.026  -0.069   0.020   1 
 
Table 1d: Correlations dlxr 
 
  dlxr_IND  dlxr_KOR  dlxr_MAL  dlxr_PHI  dlxr_THA 
dlxr_IND    1       
dlxr_KOR   0.479   1       
dlxr_MAL   0.618   0.441   1     
dlxr_PHI   0.545   0.432   0.584   1   
dlxr_THA   0.623   0.607   0.718   0.655   1 
       
 
 
  19Table 2a: MSIH(2)-AR(3) results for fxmpi 
  IND KOR  MAL  PHI  THA 
Mean 
(regression 1) 
0.6548    
(0.1639) 
0.4949    
(0.1376) 
0.4310    
(0.1771) 
0.4674    
(0.3090) 




2.5872    
(1.354) 
0.6120    
(0.2689) 
0.8311    
(1.0186)   
2.6101    
(1.3535) 
-0.0423    
(0.8815) 
SE      
(regression 1)  1.9511 0.84107  1.6194  2.9063  1.3478 
SE     
(regression 2)  10.109 2.6033  6.8225  10.227  4.6150 
Observations  
(regression 1)  137.5 65.4  124.6  113.0  145.6 
Observations  
(regression 2)  38.5 110.6  51.4  63.0  30.4 
11 p   0.9463 1  0.9405  0.9811  0.9655 
12 p   0.0537 0  0.0595  0.0189  0.0345 
21 p   0.1935 0.0089  0.1463  0.0482  0.1697 
22 p   0.8065 0.9910  0.8537  0.9518  0.8303 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching specification with two regimes and 
three autoregressive terms. The dependent variable is a foreign exchange market pressure indicator, which 
has been constructed for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
 
Table 2b: MSIH(2)-AR(3) results for dlxr 
  IND KOR  MAL  PHI  THA 
Mean 
(regression 1) 
0.2738    
(0.0342) 
0.0495    
(0.1014) 
0.1280    
(4.0660) 
-0.0035    
(0.0688) 




1.3227    
(1.2033) 
1.6585    
(2.1383) 
0.1280    
(4.0660) 
0.6837    
(0.3334) 
1.5112    
(1.2203) 
SE      
(regression 1)  0.17942 1.1660  2.3295  0.50134  0.73633 
SE     
(regression 2)  11.197 8.7569  2.3295  2.9652  6.5375 
Observations  
(regression 1)  89.3 157.7  88  88.3  145.2 
Observations  
(regression 2)  86.7 18.3  88  87.7  30.8 
11 p   0.9292 0.9657  0.7472  0.8733  0.9333 
12 p     0.0708   0.0343  0.2528  0.1267  0.0667 
21 p   0.0636 0.2920  0.2528  0.1310  0.3172 
22 p     0.9364  0.7080  0.7472  0.8690  0.6828 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching specification with two regimes and 
three autoregressive terms. The dependent variable is the percent change in the nominal exchange rate for 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
  20Table 3a: MSIH(2)-VAR(1) results for fxmpi 
  IND KOR  MAL  PHI  THA 
Mean R1  0.597619 0.503195  0.489161  0.712728  0.573284 
Mean R2  1.960138 0.641517  1.771888  0.939300  0.696158 
Stan. Err. R1  3.101309 1.702228  2.308724  3.607553  1.563642 
Stan. Err. R2  8.424579 3.172912  6.822248  10.728820  3.633208 
Obs. In R1  129.2 
Obs. In R2  43.8 
11 p   0.9635 
12 p   0.0365 
21 p   0.1128   
22 p   0.8872 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching vector autoregression of 
order 1 with two regimes. The dependent variable is a foreign exchange market pressure 
indicator, which has been constructed for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
    
Table 3b: MSIH(2)-VAR(1) results for dlxr 
  IND KOR  MAL  PHI  THA 
Mean R1  0.320101 -0.007432  -0.087561  0.140583  -0.021424 
Mean R2  1.755504 0.749433  1.143743  0.892240  0.867608 
Stan. Err. R1  1.836415 1.314356  0.629406  1.559233  0.934443 
Stan. Err. R2  17.274242 7.378275  5.211998  3.966274  6.599764 
Obs. In R1  141.2 
Obs. In R2  31.8 
11 p   0.9411 
12 p   0.0589 
21 p   0.2683 
22 p   0.7317 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching vector autoregression of 
order 1 with two regimes. The dependent variable is the percent change of the nominal exchange 






  21Table 4a: Correlations in tranquil and crisis regimes fxmpi 
  fxmpi_IND  fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI  fxmpi_THA 
fxmpi_IND  1   0.1854    -0.0974  -0.1058  0.2809 
fxmpi_KOR  0.0416 1 0.1999  -0.1314  0.0350 
fxmpi_MAL  0.0767  -0.0771  1    0.1797  -0.1883 
fxmpi_PHI  0.0837 0.0895 0.1890  1  -0.0020 
fxmpi_THA  -0.0116 -0.0267 0.0383  0.0855  1 
Notes: Contemporaneous correlations in regime 1 (tranquil) are reported below the diagonal and 




Table 4b: Correlations in tranquil and crisis regimes dlxr 
  fxmpi_IND  fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI  fxmpi_THA 
fxmpi_IND  1     0.3796    0.6450  0.7283  0.5870 
fxmpi_KOR  0.2524  1    0.3602  0.4701  0.5557 
fxmpi_MAL  -0.0005 0.0221  1  0.7886 0.7034 
fxmpi_PHI  0.1907    0.2685  0.0217  1  0.8423 
fxmpi_THA  0.5004 0.5796 0.0780 0.2670  1 
Notes: Contemporaneous correlations in regime 1 (tranquil) are reported below the diagonal and 



























  22Table 5a: Multivariate contagion test fxmpi 
 
  fxmpi_IND  fxmpi_KOR  fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI  fxmpi_THA 
Constant  0.10 (0.09)  0.44* (0.10)  0.12 (0.13)  0.15 (0.12)  0.34* (0.11) 
Delta coef.  0.35 (0.24)  0.45** (0.21)  0.28 (0.33)  0.62** (0.30)  -0.78* (0.30) 
IND φ     0.04 (0.10)  0.06 (0.12)  0.02 (0.11)  0.23* (0.10) 
KOR φ   0.06 (0.06)    0.15 (0.09)  -0.16** (0.08)  -0.05 (0.08) 
MAL φ   0.01 (0.06)  0.11*** (0.06)    0.25* (0.07)  -0.04 (0.07) 
PHI φ   -0.02 (0.06)  -0.14*** (0.07)  0.29* (0.08)    0.11 (0.07) 
THA φ   0.30* (0.06)  -0.03 (0.07)  -0.01 (0.08)  0.10 (0.08)   
IND χ     0.09 (0.13)  -0.36 (0.23)  -0.13 (0.17)  1.13* (0.19) 
KOR χ   0.21* (0.02)    0. 06 (0.05)  0.02 (0.04)  -0.29* (0.04) 
MAL χ   0.13* (0.04)  0.03 (0.05)    0.05 (0.04)  -0.19* (0.05) 
IPHI χ   -0.18* (0.03)  0.04 (0.04)  -0.05 (0.04)    0.17* (0.04) 
THA χ   -0.01 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01)*  -0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)   
Notes: Method of estimation: seemingly unrelated regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% level and *** indicate 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 5b: Multivariate contagion test dlxr 
 
  fxmpi_IND  fxmpi_KOR  fxmpi_MAL  fxmpi_PHI  fxmpi_THA 
Constant  0.13 (0.23)  0.05 (0.17)  -0.15 (0.17)  0.27 (0.20)  -0.12 (0.12) 
Delta coef.  -0.93 (0.58)  0.34 (0.42)  0.43 (0.44)  0.88*** (0.46)  -0.62** (0.30) 
IND φ     -0.12 (0.20)  -0.14 (0.21)  0.60** (0.23)  0.28** (0.13) 
KOR φ   0.07 (0.28)    -0.28 (0.21)  0.14 (0.24)  0.56*** (0.12) 
MAL φ   0.20 (0.22)  -0.10 (0.16)    0.25 (0.19)  0.23** (0.11) 
PHI φ   0.25** (0.10)  0.04 (0.07)  0.14*** (0.07)    0.15*** (0.05) 
THA φ   0.39 (0.29)  0.84* (0.19)  0.37 (0.24)  0.39 (0.27)   
IND χ     0.34 (0.21)  0.42 (0.21)  -0.42*** (0.24)  -0.33** (0.14) 
KOR χ   0.34 (0.30)    0.11*** (0.23)  -0.20 (0.26)  -0.16  (0.13) 
MAL χ   0.30 (0.24)  -0.08 (0.18)    -0.10 (0.21)  0.09 (0.13) 
IPHI χ   0.27 (0.20)  -0.28*** (0.15)  0.12 (0.15)    0.32*** (0.09) 
THA χ   -0.57*** (0.32)  -0.07 (0.22)  0.30 (0.26)  0.14 (0.29)   
Notes: Method of estimation: seemingly unrelated regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% level and *** indicate 







  23Table 6: Time-varying transition probabilities 
 
 
  KOR MAL  PHI 
  fxmpi  dlxr  fxmpi  dlxr  fxmpi  dlxr 






























































































































































Figure 1a: Nominal exchange rates in East Asia 
































Figure 1b: Nominal interest rates in East Asia 
 
 
































Figure 1c: International reserves in ($US) in East Asia 






























Figure 2a: Time series plots fxmpi 

































Figure 2b: Time series plot dlxr 
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Figure 4a: ‘Actual’ and model chronologies for Korea using fxmpi 
 
 
Figure 4b: ‘Actual’ and model chronologies for Malaysia using fxmpi 
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Figure 4c: ‘Actual’ and model chronologies for the Philippines using fxmpi 
 
 
Figure 4d: ‘Actual’ and model chronologies for Korea using dlxr 
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Figure 4f: ‘Actual’ and model chronologies for the Philippines using dlxr 
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